An alternating-treatment design was used to compare the productivity of college students engaged in a card-sorting task under an individual monetary incentive system and a 10-member group monetary incentive system. In both pay conditions, subjects received a base pay plus incentives contingent upon the number of cards sorted in 20-minute sessions. In the individual incentive condition, subjects earned $0.005 for each card sorted over 400 cards. In the group incentive condition, incentives were based on the group average, with all subjects earning $0.005 for each card by which the group average exceeded 400. Subjects received feedback on their performance and the performance of other group members in both conditions. The number of cards sorted did not differ significantly under the two pay systems. Subjects reported the systems to be equally enjoyable and demanding, however, when asked which pay system they would prefer to work under in the future, high performers chose the individual incentive system, and low performers chose the group incentive system. In a recent survey of over 500 U. S. companies, 91 % reported that they had significantly altered their organizational culture in order to respond to competitive market demands (Flannery, Hofrichter, & Platten, 1996) . Moreover, 54% of those companies have begun to realign their pay systems to support those changes, and 73% acknowledged the necessity to do so. Many change strategies include the creation of work teams. In 1991, Wellins, Byham, and Wilson reported that approximately 25% of all U. S. industries were experimenting with work teams. And although only 12-16% of companies currently use small group incentives
, Flannery et al. (1996) predict that their use will increase along with the trend toward team work structures.
In spite of the projected increase in use of group incentives, few studies have empirically examined their effects on performance. Instead, evaluations generally rely on subjective reports from surveys. Although individual incentives have increased productivity in both applied and laboratory settings (for a review, see Dickinson & Gillette, 1993) , it is not yet clear that group incentives result in comparable increases.
When group pay contingencies are in effect, a worker's pay is dependent upon the group's productivity. Because workers have less control over their individual earnings under group pay systems, they may be less productive under such systems than under individual incentive systems (Dickinson & Gillette, 1993; Lawler, 1990) . Dierks and McNally (1987) argue against group pay contingencies on the grounds that, over time, high performers are likely to decrease their performance after repeatedly seeing their earnings reduced by poor performers. Poor performers, in contrast, may continue to perform below average because they benefit from the labor of the other group members, an effect commonly referred to as the ''free rider" effect (Organ & Bateman, 1989) . Dickinson and Gillette (1993) contend that such an effect is likely to be more pervasive as the size of the group increases because workers perceive that their rewards, supported by the performance of others, will not be significantly decreased by their own low productivity. Thus, individual productivity and, as a result, total group productivity, may be lower under group pay contingencies than under individual pay contingencies.
The relative effectiveness of group incentives, however, may depend upon the size of the group. In small groups, workers have the ability to influence the group's productivity substantially, thereby markedly raising or lowering their own earnings. As the group size increases, the capacity of an individual worker to control his or her wages under group incentive conditions decreases. Blinder (1990) refers to the change in control as the "1/nth problem," in which n represents the number of employees in the group. According to Blinder, as n increases, individual performance is likely to decrease. Applying similar logic, Lawler (1990) states that a worker's "line of sight" becomes obscured as the size of the incentive group becomes larger.
The results of two early field studies support this type of reasoning. Marriott (1949) examined productivity in groups of less than 10, 10-19, 20-29, 30-39, 40-49 , and over 50 workers in two large factories. He found low, but statistically significant, inverse correlations between group size and performance. Campbell (1952) reported similar results for groups ranging in size from under 20 to over 40 individuals. When smaller groups have been studied in laboratory settings, however, productivity has been comparable under individual and group incentives (Farr, 1976; London & Oldham, 1977; Stoneman & Dickinson, 1989) . Farr (1976) compared the effectiveness of hourly pay, individual incentive pay, and two types of group incentive pay on the performance of three-person groups. Under the individual incentive condition, the performer's incentives were based solely on his/her own performance. In the equal group pay condition each member received equivalent pay, with the amount based on the group's total performance. Under the differential group pay system the highest performer received 50% of the available incentives, the middle performer 33%, and the lowest performer 17%. Individual and group incentives resulted in similar performance levels, all of which were significantly above the levels attained with hourly pay. In a 1977 study, London and Oldham compared three types of group incentive systems with an individual incentive system (piece-work pay), and with hourly pay. Groups comprised two members and incentives were based on the average performance of both performers, the performance of the high performer, or the performance of the low performer. In the latter two conditions, both members received the amount of incentives earned by the high or low performer, respectively. The individual and high-performer group incentives resulted in significantly greater productivity than the other pay conditions. Productivity did not differ between the individual and high-performer group incentive conditions. Stoneman and Dickinson (1989) compared the effects of individual incentives with those of group incentives when groups were comprised of 2, 4, 5, and 9 members. Results revealed that college students' performances in a simulated check-entering task did not change from the individual incentive level when subjects were exposed to the group incentive system, regardless of the size of the group. In addition, overall group productivity did not differ as a function of group size.
The discrepancies between the results of the field studies (Campbell, 1952; Marriott, 1949) and those of the laboratory studies (Farr, 1976; London & Oldham, 1977; Stoneman & Dickinson, 1989) may be caused by the size of the groups studied. Larger groups were included in the field studies, which may have contributed to the inverse relation between group size and productivity observed in those studies. In a recent survey of organizations that employ small group incentives, Peck (1990) found that groups typically ranged in size from 7 to 20 members, with a mode of 10. The purpose of the present study was to compare productivity under individual and group incentives with 10-member groups. As in Stoneman and Dickinson (1989) , subjects were repeatedly exposed to both types of pay systems and individual data were recorded so that changes in individual productivity could be assessed. Although not the main purpose of the present study, this type of assessment would also reveal any tendency for individuals to decrease their performance in group settings, a phenomenon known as "social loafing" (Guerin, 1994; Latane, Williams, & Harkins, 1979) . Social loafing has commonly been demonstrated in settings where incentives have been absent (Bartis, Szymanski, & Harkins, 1988; Harkins, 1987; Szymanski & Harkins, 1993; Williams, Harkins, & Latane, 1981) , but it may be mitigated or eliminated by incentives. Such a finding is likely because performance feedback and evaluation have been shown to decrease social loafing (Harkins, 1987; Harkins & Jackson, 1985; . Not only was feedback provided as part of the current intervention, but the incentives themselves provided evaluative performance information.
In contrast to the procedures used by Stoneman and Dickinson (1989) , public feedback was provided in the present study so that group members could compare their performance to the individual performance of other group members. This feature was added in order to simulate more aptly an actual work environment, where workers characteristically come to know the performance levels of others as a result of working together over protracted periods of time.
Method

Subjects
Subjects were 20 undergraduate students recruited from psychology classes at a large midwestern state university. Subject selection was based on understanding of the study's pay conditions following instruction, assessed by a quiz, and on financial need, assessed by a questionnaire. Subjects were paid individual and group monetary incentives as detailed in the Independent Variable section. In addition, subjects were given a $10.00 bonus for completing the study. Two subjects withdrew before the end of the study. These subjects received the incentives they had earned up to the point of their withdrawal.
Setting
The study was conducted in an experimental laboratory containing several chairs and tables, a chalkboard, a telephone, a refrigerator, a microwave oven, and several items (e.g., crossword puzzles, magazines, and playing cards) that allowed subjects to engage in alternatives to the required activity (i.e., card sorting). Subjects were permitted to bring reading and homework materials with them to the sessions. In all sessions, 10 subjects were seated around a large rectangular table with the experimental materials positioned in front of them. Each subject chose a nickname, and the nickname was written on a place card next to the subject's work area.
Work Task
The work task was similar to a computer data card sorting task used in previous research (Farr, 1976; London & Oldham, 1977; Pritchard & Curtis, 1973) . Subjects sorted cards punched with varying patterns of holes onto boards with corresponding wooden dowels. There were 12 different patterns of holes. Cards could not be sorted improperly onto the boards, therefore, quality of performance could not vary.
Dependent Variables
The primary dependent variable was the number of cards sorted by each subject during each of 14 20-minute sessions. The number of cards was determined by measuring the thickness of the stack of sorted cards using a digital caliper sensitive to 0.001 inch (0.00254 cm). The measurement system, similar to that used by Farr (1976) , permitted the researcher to record data for all 10 subjects during 10-minute breaks between sessions. The number of cards corresponding to each micrometer measure was determined prior to the study and confirmed after the study to ensure that handling of the cards had not influenced their thickness.
At the end of the study, subjects were asked to rate on as-point Likert scale how enjoyable and demanding they found each of the two pay conditions to be. For the enjoyment rating, "1" was anchored as "Did not enjoy it at all" and "5" as "Enjoyed it very much." For the demand rating, "1" was anchored as "No pressure" and "5" as 'Very demanding." Subjects also were asked to respond to the following question: "If you could choose which pay system you would work under, which system would you choose?"
Independent Variable
Each subject was exposed to individual and group (n = 10) monetary incentive conditions. In the individual incentive condition, subjects received a base pay of $1.00 for sorting a minimum of 300 cards during the 20-minute session. This minimum work requirement, set at approximately two standard deviations below the mean performance of pilot subjects, was implemented to simulate an actual work setting where employees must perform at minimal levels or face termination. Subjects earned a piece-rate pay of $.005 for every card sorted over 400 cards, which was approximately one standard deviation below the average performance of pilot subjects. In the group incentive condition, the performance of the group was averaged and subjects received $1.00 base pay if the group average exceeded 300 cards, plus $.005 for every card by which the group average exceeded 400. For example, if the group sorted an average of 700 cards, each member would receive $2.50 for the session: $1.00 base pay plus $1.50 in incentive pay [(700-400 incentive minimum) = 300 cards; 300 cards x $.005 incentive per card = $1.50].
Subjects received private and public feedback at the end of each session during both pay conditions. After each session, the individual performance of each member of the group was displayed on a chalkboard, next to the nickname chosen by the subject. Thus, each subject was aware of the performance of other subjects. During the group pay condition, the average performance of the group was also displayed on the chalkboard and announced by the experimenter. After all sessions, subjects were provided with a private written tally of the number of cards they had sorted, and the amount of pay they had earned during each session. At the end of the study, subjects exchanged their private written tallies for money.
Experimental Design
The study was conducted with two 10-person groups (Group 1 and Group 2, with subjects randomly assigned to groups), using an alternating-treatments design (Barlow & Hayes, 1979) . Experimental sessions lasted 20 minutes and were followed by 10-minute breaks, which were necessary for observers to record performance. Subjects participated on two consecutive days, completing seven sessions per day. The individual incentive condition was implemented first, and then alternated with the group incentive condition for the remaining sessions. In order to diminish any carry-over effects, before the start of each session the experimenter announced which pay condition was in effect and wrote the word "INDIVIDUA~' or "GROUP" on a chalkboard located at the front of the room.
Experimental Procedure
Each subject attended a pre-experimental session during which the experimenter explained the purpose of the study, obtained informed consent, described the individual and group pay contingencies, and administered the subject selection quiz and questionnaire. The following study description was read to potential subjects and provided in writing as part of the informed consent form.
You are being invited to participate in a research study investigating the effects of monetary incentives on work performance. As a participant in this study, you will be required to sort cards for four hours a day for two consecutive days. Cards will be sorted according to the punches in three columns on the cards. Two of the three columns could have one of three possible punches for a total of twelve possible punch combinations. Each of the cards is to be sorted on a board containing combinations of wooden dowels corresponding to the punches in the card. I have given you the card sorting apparatus that you can look at. You will be seated at a large conference table, in a large conference room with nine other people. A stack of cards and the sorting apparatus will be placed on the table in front of you. You will be able to get up, take a break, and enjoy other activities available (i.e., magazines, playing cards, homework) at any time during the study.
You will receive monetary compensation for your participation in the study. You will be paid two different ways during the study. In one pay condition, the total amount of money you will earn will depend upon how many cards you sort. In the other pay condition, the total amount of money you earn will depend upon how many cards are sorted by you and nine other individuals. Compensation will be at least $34.00, which includes a $10.00 bonus for completing the study. You may earn more money depending upon your performance and the performance of the other nine individuals. The information obtained from this study may allow businesses to better design pay systems that satisfy both the organization and the employee.
The pay contingencies were then described in detail. Subjects were given the opportunity to perform the task, and ask questions regarding the nature of the task and the pay contingencies.
On the first day of the study, the subjects were reminded of the task and the fact that they could take breaks whenever they wanted during the experimental sessions. Before the beginning of each session the experimenter wrote the performance data of the subjects on the chalkboard located in front of the room, announced which pay condition was in effect for the session, wrote the pay condition on the board, and left the laboratory. Twenty minutes later, the experimenter returned to the laboratory, terminated the ongoing session, and began preparing for the following session.
Results
It was not possible to obtain interobserver agreement measures during the 10-minute breaks between sessions because of the amount of time required to collect data and prepare for the next session. Thus, agreement between independent observers was compared during simulated break periods after the study. The primary observers were given boxes of 10 sets of cards, simulating the procedure used in the study, and allowed 10 minutes to measure them. The number of cards in each set was the same number of cards as actually sorted by a subject during a given session. A second independent observer subsequently measured each set of cards. This procedure was repeated for 60 boxes of cards, which is equivalent to 24% of the total number of boxes measured in the study. Agreement was calculated by dividing the number of agreements on the number of cards in a set by the total number of sets measured, and multiplying the result by 100. An agreement was scored when the two measurements by independent observers did not differ by more than .02 inch (0.0508 cm). Each card was .01 inch (0.0254 cm) thick, with two cards measuring .02 inch (0.0508 cm). This criterion was adopted because subjects received $.01 for sorting two cards ($.005 per card). Agreement between observers was 100%. Figures 1 and 2 show the number of cards sorted each session by individuals in Groups 1 and 2, respectively. In these figures, the general performance of participants determines where their data are depicted, with high performers depicted above lower performers. For all subjects, performance increased across the first six to seven sessions, indicating a practice effect. After those initial sessions, performance stabilized. Visual inspection of individual-subject data indicated that, in general, similar numbers of cards were sorted under the individual and group conditions. During the last six sessions, when performance stabilized, subjects Figure 2. Number of cards sorted per 20-minute experimental session by individual subjects in Group 2 when they were exposed to individual and group incentives. Subjects' performances determined where their data are displayed; high performers appear at the top of the figure, low performers at the bottom. Note that two subjects in this group did not complete the experiment.
samples t test was used to determine whether the mean difference, although small, was statistically significant. The means for the individual and group conditions were 690 and 681, respectively. The difference was not statistically significant (t = 1.30, df = 17, p> .05).
Performance differed across participants, ranging from 562 to 930 cards sorted per session. Nonetheless, as seen in Figures 1 and 2 , high, medium, and low performers were not differentially affected by the individual and group incentives. To examine further the relationship between overall performance and response to the incentive systems, average performance for the last six sessions (pooled across conditions) was correlated with the difference between average performance under the individual and the group conditions. A significant positive correlation would mean that the higher the overall performance, the greater the contrast, with higher performance occurring during the individual condition. The correlation coefficient, however, was low and nonsignificant (r = 0.06, df = 16, P > .05). Thus, higher overall performance was not associated with greater superiority of individual incentives. Table 1 shows the average amount of money earned per session for each subject during the last six sessions. In Group 1, 5 of 10 subjects sorted more cards in each condition than the mean for the group. Therefore, these subjects earned less money in the group incentive condition than in the individual condition. In Group 2, 4 of 8 subjects performed above the group mean in both conditions, and earned less money under group incentives. Pearson product moment correlations were conducted to determine whether, as might be expected, higher performers earned more money during the last six sessions and during the individual incentive condition than lower performers. To examine these relationships, average performance was correlated first with the average amount earned, and then with the difference between the average amount earned under the two conditions. Both correlation coefficients were high and significant (r = .97, df = 16, P < .001; and r = .86, df = 16, P < .001). Moreover, although high performers earned more money during the individual incentive condition, they did not perform better. The contrast between their individual and group performance was not greater either. Subjects rated the extent to which they enjoyed the pay systems on a 5-point Likert rating scale, with 1 indicating the least enjoyment and 5 the most. Data were collapsed across groups, and a correlated samples t test was used to determine whether the mean difference was statistically significant. The mean ratings for the individual and group conditions were 3.6 and 3.3, respectively. The difference was not statistically significant (t = 1, df = 17, p> .05).
A number of factors in the present study might have influenced the extent to which subjects found the pay systems enjoyable. For example, high performers might have found the individual incentives to be more enjoyable, while the reverse might have been true for low performers. Because the t test could not reveal such relationships, Pearson product moment correlations were conducted. In the present study, four factors may have influenced, or been associated with, enjoyment: (a) overall average performance; (b) differences in performance under the individual and group incentives; (c) average earnings; and (d) differences in earnings under the individual and group incentives. Moreover, these factors may have influenced (a) the absolute enjoyment rating for the individual incentives, (b) the absolute rating for the group incentives, and/or (c) the difference between the two ratings. Correlation coefficients were calculated for the twelve possible relationships (the 4 independent variables x the 3 dependent variables). None was significant. To reach significance with 16 degrees of freedom, a .40 correlation was required. The coefficients, with signs stripped, ranged from .01 to .23.
Subjects also rated on a 5-point Likert rating scale, with 1 indicating no pressure and 5 the most, the extent to which they found the pay systems demanding. The mean ratings for the individual and group conditions were 3.2 and 3.4, respectively. The difference between the means was not significant (t = -0.60, df = 17, P > .05.). Similar correlational analyses were conducted for these ratings as for the enjoyment ratings. Once again, none of the 12 coefficients was significant, ranging, with signs stripped, from .01 to .22.
When asked to indicate which pay system they would choose to work under if given an option, 10 subjects chose the individual incentive system , and 7 the group system. The choice data are not a significant departure from p = .50 for a binomial distribution. Point-biserial correlations revealed high and significant relationships between: (a) average performance and choice of incentive systems (r = .80, df = 15, P < .001); (b) average pay and choice (r = .78, df = 15, P < .001); and (c) differential pay and choice (r = .69 , df = 15, P < .01). Thus, high performers, high earners, and those who earned more money under individual incentives preferred the individual incentive system, whereas low performers, low earners, and those who earned more money under the group incentives generally preferred the group incentive system.
Discussion
Individual performance was comparable under individual and group incentives. These results are consistent with the findings of previous investigations that have examined groups ranging in size from 2 to 9 members (Farr, 1976; London & Oldham, 1977; Stoneman & Dickinson, 1989) . The current experimental design permitted assessment of each individual's performance under individual and group incentive conditions, and consequently allowed the responses of high and low performers to be compared across conditions. Doing so is of interest, because Dierks and McNally (1987) suggest that under a group incentive system, top performers may decrease their performance when their earnings are reduced by poor performers, while poor performers are likely to continue to perform below average because they benefit from the performance of other members.
The present findings support Dierks and McNally's position regarding low performers, but refute their position regarding top performers, as did the results obtained by Stoneman and Dickinson (1989) . The current results provide stronger evidence of the effects of individual and group incentives on high and low performers, however, because in Stoneman and Dickinson's 9-member group there were no discernible high or low performers. Clear and substantial performance differences across subjects were observed in the present study. Moreover, top performers were aware of the poorer performance of others because of the public feedback, and they earned less under the group incentive system. Nonetheless, they maintained their performance under that system. As suggested by Stoneman and Dickinson (1989) , 'Top performers may recognize, particularly in small groups, that decreases in their own performance would lead to further reductions in earnings" (p. 147).
Subjects reported the individual and group incentive systems to be equally enjoyable and demanding. Interestingly, these ratings were not influenced by performance or pay. However, strong relationships emerged when choice was correlated with performance and pay. High performers, high earners, and those who earned more during the individual condition preferred individual incentives, whereas low performers, low earners, and those who earned more during the group condition preferred group incentives. By design in the current study, high performance and high wages covaried, and thus it is not possible to know with certainty which of these factors influenced subject choice. Nonetheless, it seems probable, based on a review of prior research, that pay was a determinant of that choice (see Dickinson & Gillette, 1993) . Further, such an interpretation is consistent with results reported by Dickinson and Gillette (1993) , whose subjects stated that they preferred one incentive system over another "because they earned more money" (p. 57). Whatever the reason, the choice data are notable for employers interested in arranging satisfying pay contingencies for their top performers.
Equivalent effects of individual and group incentives have now been found, and replicated, for 2-10 person groups in the laboratory. There is obvious need to conduct similar studies in actual work settings, because the laboratory studies share some common features that may influence results and limit their generality. In all of the laboratory studies, subjects were college students, whose earnings from the study were more discretionary than is the pay of actual employees. The durations of the studies were short in comparison to an employment situation, which may directly affect responses to the pay contingencies or produce different social interactions which, in turn, affect responding under group contingencies. Finally, experimental sessions were short in comparison to the normal work day, and subjects may work diligently throughout the session to maximize their earnings, unlike actual employees who work 7 to 8 hours a day, day in and day out.
